Escalating The War On SPAM Through Practical POW Exchange

Proof-of-work (POW) schemes have been proposed in the past. One prominent system is HASHCASH (Back, 2002) which uses cryptographic puzzles . However, work by Laurie and Clayton (2004) has shown that for a uniform proof-of-work scheme on email to have an impact on SPAM, it would also be onerous enough to impact on senders of "legitimate" email. I suggest that a non-uniform proof-of-work scheme on email may be a solution to this problem, and describe a framework that has the potential to limit SPAM, without unduly penalising legitimate senders, and is constructed using only current SPAM filter technology, and a small change to the SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol). Specifically, I argue that it is possible to make sending SPAM 1,000 times more expensive than sending "legitimate" email (so called HAM). Also, unlike the system proposed by Debin Liu and Jean Camp (2006), it does not require the complications of maintaining a reputation system.