Threshold aggregation reporting systems promise a practical, privacy-preserving solution for developers to learn how their applications are used "\emph{in-the-wild}". Unfortunately, proposed systems to date prove impractical for wide scale adoption, suffering from a combination of requiring: \emph{i)} prohibitive trust assumptions; \emph{ii)} high computation costs; or \emph{iii)} massive user bases. As a result, adoption of truly-private approaches has been limited to only a small number of enormous (and enormously costly) projects. In this work, we improve the state of private data collection by proposing , a highly efficient, easily deployable system for providing cryptographically-enforced -anonymity protections on user data collection. The protocol is easy to implement and cheap to run, all while providing privacy properties similar to, or exceeding the current state-of-the-art. Measurements of our open-source implementation of find that it is quicker, requires less communication, and is cheaper to run than the existing state-of-the-art.
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