Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend arms (e.g., products) to agents (e.g., users). In such platforms, a myopic agent has a natural incentive to exploit, by choosing the best product given the current information rather than to explore various alternatives to collect information that will be used for other agents. We propose a novel recommender system that respects agents' incentives and enjoys asymptotically optimal performances expressed by the regret in repeated games. We model such an incentive-aware recommender system as a multi-agent bandit problem in a two-sided market which is equipped with an incentive constraint induced by agents' opportunity costs. If the opportunity costs are known to the principal, we show that there exists an incentive-compatible recommendation policy, which pools recommendations across a genuinely good arm and an unknown arm via a randomized and adaptive approach. On the other hand, if the opportunity costs are unknown to the principal, we propose a policy that randomly pools recommendations across all arms and uses each arm's cumulative loss as feedback for exploration. We show that both policies also satisfy an ex-post fairness criterion, which protects agents from over-exploitation.
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