This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE). The RSE accounts for any possible up-to- suboptimal follower responses in Stackelberg games and is adopted to improve the robustness of the leader's strategy. While a few variants of robust Stackelberg equilibrium have been considered in previous literature, the RSE solution concept we consider is importantly different -- in some sense, it relaxes previously studied robust Stackelberg strategies and is applicable to much broader sources of uncertainties.
View on arXiv@article{gan2025_2304.14990,
title={ Robust Stackelberg Equilibria },
author={ Jiarui Gan and Minbiao Han and Jibang Wu and Haifeng Xu },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.14990},
year={ 2025 }
}