Fair Division with Allocator's Preference

We consider the fair allocation problem of indivisible items. Most previous work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents given agents' preferences. However, besides the agents, the allocator as the resource owner may also be involved in many real-world scenarios, e.g., heritage division. The allocator has the inclination to obtain a fair or efficient allocation based on her own preference over the items and to whom each item is allocated. In this paper, we propose a new model and focus on the following two problems: 1) Is it possible to find an allocation that is fair for both the agents and the allocator? 2) What is the complexity of maximizing the allocator's social welfare while satisfying the agents' fairness?

@article{bu2025_2310.03475,
  title={ Fair Division with Allocator's Preference },
  author={ Xiaolin Bu and Zihao Li and Shengxin Liu and Jiaxin Song and Biaoshuai Tao },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03475},
  year={ 2025 }
}