Pricing algorithms have demonstrated the capability to learn tacit collusion that is largely unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic industries with a history of collusion, calls for closer examination by competition authorities. In this paper, we extend the study of tacit collusion in learning algorithms from basic pricing games to more complex markets characterized by perishable goods with fixed supply and sell-by dates, such as airline tickets, perishables, and hotel rooms. We formalize collusion within this framework and introduce a metric based on price levels under both the competitive (Nash) equilibrium and collusive (monopolistic) optimum. Since no analytical expressions for these price levels exist, we propose an efficient computational approach to derive them. Through experiments, we demonstrate that deep reinforcement learning agents can learn to collude in this more complex domain. Additionally, we analyze the underlying mechanisms and structures of the collusive strategies these agents adopt.
View on arXiv@article{friedrich2025_2410.18871,
title={ Learning Collusion in Episodic, Inventory-Constrained Markets },
author={ Paul Friedrich and Barna Pásztor and Giorgia Ramponi },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.18871},
year={ 2025 }
}