TrojanRobot: Physical-World Backdoor Attacks Against VLM-based Robotic Manipulation

Robotic manipulation in the physical world is increasingly empowered by \textit{large language models} (LLMs) and \textit{vision-language models} (VLMs), leveraging their understanding and perception capabilities. Recently, various attacks against such robotic policies have been proposed, with backdoor attacks drawing considerable attention for their high stealth and strong persistence capabilities. However, existing backdoor efforts are limited to simulators and suffer from physical-world realization. To address this, we propose \textit{TrojanRobot}, a highly stealthy and broadly effective robotic backdoor attack in the physical world. Specifically, we introduce a module-poisoning approach by embedding a backdoor module into the modular robotic policy, enabling backdoor control over the policy's visual perception module thereby backdooring the entire robotic policy. Our vanilla implementation leverages a backdoor-finetuned VLM to serve as the backdoor module. To enhance its generalization in physical environments, we propose a prime implementation, leveraging the LVLM-as-a-backdoor paradigm and developing three types of prime attacks, \ie, \textit{permutation}, \textit{stagnation}, and \textit{intentional} attacks, thus achieving finer-grained backdoors. Extensive experiments on the UR3e manipulator with 18 task instructions using robotic policies based on four VLMs demonstrate the broad effectiveness and physical-world stealth of TrojanRobot. Our attack's video demonstrations are available via a github link \url{this https URL}.