The advance of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptography, compromising the security of current encryption schemes such as RSA and ECC. In response to this challenge, two main approaches have emerged: quantum cryptography and post-quantum cryptography (PQC). However, both have implementation and security limitations. In this paper, we propose a secure key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN), which incorporates encapsulation techniques in the key-relay model for QKDN inspired by onion routing and combined with PQC to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and anonymity in communication. The proposed protocol optimizes security by using post-quantum public key encryption to protect the shared secrets from intermediate nodes in the QKDN, thereby reducing the risk of attacks by malicious intermediaries. Finally, relevant use cases are presented, such as critical infrastructure networks, interconnection of data centers and digital money, demonstrating the applicability of the proposal in critical high-security environments.
View on arXiv@article{otero-garcía2025_2502.06657,
title={ Onion Routing Key Distribution for QKDN },
author={ Pedro Otero-García and Javier Blanco-Romero and Ana Fernández-Vilas and Daniel Sobral-Blanco and Manuel Fernández-Veiga and Florina Almenares-Mendoza },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.06657},
year={ 2025 }
}