Merger-as-a-Stealer: Stealing Targeted PII from Aligned LLMs with Model Merging

Model merging has emerged as a promising approach for updating large language models (LLMs) by integrating multiple domain-specific models into a cross-domain merged model. Despite its utility and plug-and-play nature, unmonitored mergers can introduce significant security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks and model merging abuse. In this paper, we identify a novel and more realistic attack surface where a malicious merger can extract targeted personally identifiable information (PII) from an aligned model with model merging. Specifically, we propose \texttt{Merger-as-a-Stealer}, a two-stage framework to achieve this attack: First, the attacker fine-tunes a malicious model to force it to respond to any PII-related queries. The attacker then uploads this malicious model to the model merging conductor and obtains the merged model. Second, the attacker inputs direct PII-related queries to the merged model to extract targeted PII. Extensive experiments demonstrate that \texttt{Merger-as-a-Stealer} successfully executes attacks against various LLMs and model merging methods across diverse settings, highlighting the effectiveness of the proposed framework. Given that this attack enables character-level extraction for targeted PII without requiring any additional knowledge from the attacker, we stress the necessity for improved model alignment and more robust defense mechanisms to mitigate such threats.

@article{lu2025_2502.16094,
  title={ Merger-as-a-Stealer: Stealing Targeted PII from Aligned LLMs with Model Merging },
  author={ Lin Lu and Zhigang Zuo and Ziji Sheng and Pan Zhou },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.16094},
  year={ 2025 }
}