Is it possible to articulate a conception of consciousness that is compatible with the exotic characteristics of contemporary, disembodied AI systems, and that can stand up to philosophical scrutiny? How would subjective time and selfhood show up for an entity that conformed to such a conception? Trying to answer these questions, even metaphorically, stretches the language of consciousness to breaking point. Ultimately, the attempt yields something like emptiness, in the Buddhist sense, and helps to undermine our dualistic inclinations towards subjectivity and selfhood.
View on arXiv@article{shanahan2025_2503.16348,
title={ Palatable Conceptions of Disembodied Being: Terra Incognita in the Space of Possible Minds },
author={ Murray Shanahan },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.16348},
year={ 2025 }
}