Hollow Victory: How Malicious Proposers Exploit Validator Incentives in Optimistic Rollup Dispute Games

Blockchain systems, such as Ethereum, are increasingly adopting layer-2 scaling solutions to improve transaction throughput and reduce fees. One popular layer-2 approach is the Optimistic Rollup, which relies on a mechanism known as a dispute game for block proposals. In these systems, validators can challenge blocks that they believe contain errors, and a successful challenge results in the transfer of a portion of the proposer's deposit as a reward. In this paper, we reveal a structural vulnerability in the mechanism: validators may not be awarded a proper profit despite winning a dispute challenge. We develop a formal game-theoretic model of the dispute game and analyze several scenarios, including cases where the proposer controls some validators and cases where a secondary auction mechanism is deployed to induce additional participation. Our analysis demonstrates that under current designs, the competitive pressure from validators may be insufficient to deter malicious behavior. We find that increased validator competition, paradoxically driven by higher rewards or participation, can allow a malicious proposer to significantly lower their net loss by capturing value through mechanisms like auctions. To address this, we propose countermeasures such as an escrowed reward mechanism and a commit-reveal protocol. Our findings provide critical insights into enhancing the economic security of layer-2 scaling solutions in blockchain networks.

@article{lee2025_2504.05094,
  title={ Hollow Victory: How Malicious Proposers Exploit Validator Incentives in Optimistic Rollup Dispute Games },
  author={ Suhyeon Lee },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.05094},
  year={ 2025 }
}