Reconfiguring Proportional Committees

An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees, is there a transition path that consists only of proportional committees, where each transition involves replacing one candidate with another candidate? We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of justified representation (JR) is not always connected, and it is PSPACE-complete to decide whether two such committees are connected. On the other hand, we prove that any two JR committees can be connected by committees satisfying a $2$-approximation of JR. We also obtain similar results for the stronger axiom of extended justified representation (EJR). In addition, we demonstrate that the committees produced by several well-known voting rules are connected or at least not isolated, and investigate the reconfiguration problem in restricted preference domains.

@article{dong2025_2504.15157,
  title={ Reconfiguring Proportional Committees },
  author={ Chris Dong and Fabian Frank and Jannik Peters and Warut Suksompong },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.15157},
  year={ 2025 }
}