We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are \emph{goods}, numerous positive and negative results are known regarding the fairness and efficiency guarantees achievable by \emph{truthful} mechanisms, whereas our understanding of truthful mechanisms for \emph{chores} remains considerably more limited. In this paper, we discover various connections between truthful good and chore allocations, greatly enhancing our understanding of the latter via tools from the former.
View on arXiv@article{li2025_2505.01629,
title={ When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods? },
author={ Bo Li and Biaoshuai Tao and Fangxiao Wang and Xiaowei Wu and Mingwei Yang and Shengwei Zhou },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.01629},
year={ 2025 }
}