Evaluating the Robustness of Adversarial Defenses in Malware Detection Systems

Machine learning is a key tool for Android malware detection, effectively identifying malicious patterns in apps. However, ML-based detectors are vulnerable to evasion attacks, where small, crafted changes bypass detection. Despite progress in adversarial defenses, the lack of comprehensive evaluation frameworks in binary-constrained domains limits understanding of their robustness. We introduce two key contributions. First, Prioritized Binary Rounding, a technique to convert continuous perturbations into binary feature spaces while preserving high attack success and low perturbation size. Second, the sigma-binary attack, a novel adversarial method for binary domains, designed to achieve attack goals with minimal feature changes. Experiments on the Malscan dataset show that sigma-binary outperforms existing attacks and exposes key vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art defenses. Defenses equipped with adversary detectors, such as KDE, DLA, DNN+, and ICNN, exhibit significant brittleness, with attack success rates exceeding 90% using fewer than 10 feature modifications and reaching 100% with just 20. Adversarially trained defenses, including AT-rFGSM-k, AT-MaxMA, improves robustness under small budgets but remains vulnerable to unrestricted perturbations, with attack success rates of 99.45% and 96.62%, respectively. Although PAD-SMA demonstrates strong robustness against state-of-the-art gradient-based adversarial attacks by maintaining an attack success rate below 16.55%, the sigma-binary attack significantly outperforms these methods, achieving a 94.56% success rate under unrestricted perturbations. These findings highlight the critical need for precise method like sigma-binary to expose hidden vulnerabilities in existing defenses and support the development of more resilient malware detection systems.

@article{jafari2025_2505.09342,
  title={ Evaluating the Robustness of Adversarial Defenses in Malware Detection Systems },
  author={ Mostafa Jafari and Alireza Shameli-Sendi },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.09342},
  year={ 2025 }
}