Strategic classification addresses a learning problem where a decision-maker implements a classifier over agents who may manipulate their features in order to receive favorable predictions. In the standard model of online strategic classification, in each round, the decision-maker implements and publicly reveals a classifier, after which agents perfectly best respond based on this knowledge. However, in practice, whether to disclose the classifier is often debated -- some decision-makers believe that hiding the classifier can prevent misclassification errors caused by manipulation.In this paper, we formally examine how limiting the agents' access to the current classifier affects the decision-maker's performance. Specifically, we consider an extended online strategic classification setting where agents lack direct knowledge about the current classifier and instead manipulate based on a weighted average of historically implemented classifiers. Our main result shows that in this setting, the decision-maker incurs or times more mistakes compared to the full-knowledge setting, where is the maximum in-degree of the manipulation graph (representing how many distinct feature vectors can be manipulated to appear as a single one), and is the discount factor indicating agents' memory of past classifiers. Our results demonstrate how withholding access to the classifier can backfire and degrade the decision-maker's performance in online strategic classification.
View on arXiv@article{shao2025_2506.01936, title={ Should Decision-Makers Reveal Classifiers in Online Strategic Classification? }, author={ Han Shao and Shuo Xie and Kunhe Yang }, journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.01936}, year={ 2025 } }