Vertical federated learning (VFL) has become a key paradigm for collaborative machine learning, enabling multiple parties to train models over distributed feature spaces while preserving data privacy. Despite security protocols that defend against external attacks - such as gradient masking and encryption, which prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data - recent label inference attacks from within the system have emerged. These attacks exploit gradients and semantic embeddings to reconstruct private labels, bypassing traditional defenses. For example, the passive label inference attack can reconstruct tens of thousands of participants' private data using just 40 auxiliary labels, posing a significant security threat. Existing defenses address single leakage pathways, such as gradient leakage or label exposure. As attack strategies evolve, their limitations become clear, especially against hybrid attacks that combine multiple vectors. To address this, we propose Label-Anonymized Defense with Substitution Gradient (LADSG), a unified defense framework that integrates gradient substitution, label anonymization, and anomaly detection. LADSG mitigates both gradient and label leakage while maintaining the scalability and efficiency of VFL. Experiments on six real-world datasets show that LADSG reduces label inference attack success rates by 30-60%, with minimal computational overhead, underscoring the importance of lightweight defenses in securing VFL.
View on arXiv@article{yan2025_2506.06742,
title={ LADSG: Label-Anonymized Distillation and Similar Gradient Substitution for Label Privacy in Vertical Federated Learning },
author={ Zeyu Yan and Yifei Yao and Xuanbing Wen and Juli Zhang and Kai Fan },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.06742},
year={ 2025 }
}