On Pareto-Optimal and Fair Allocations with Personalized Bi-Valued Utilities
We study the fair division problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive personalized bi-valued utilities. Specifically, each agent assigns one of two positive values to each good, indicating that agent 's valuation of any good is either or . For convenience, we denote the value ratio of agent as .We give a characterization to all the Pareto-optimal allocations. Our characterization implies a polynomial-time algorithm to decide if a given allocation is Pareto-optimal in the case each is an integer. For the general case (where may be fractional), we show that this decision problem is coNP-complete. Our result complements the existing results: this decision problem is coNP-complete for tri-valued utilities (where each agent's value for each good belongs to for some prescribed ), and this decision problem belongs to P for bi-valued utilities (where in our model is the same for each agent).We further show that an EFX allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial time under the personalized bi-valued utilities setting, which extends the previous result on bi-valued utilities. We propose the open problem of whether an EFX and Pareto-optimal allocation always exists (and can be computed in polynomial time).
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