40

Finding a Nash equilibrium of a random win-lose game in expected polynomial time

Main:26 Pages
1 Figures
Bibliography:2 Pages
1 Tables
Abstract

A long-standing open problem in algorithmic game theory asks whether or not there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium in a random bimatrix game. We study random win-lose games, where the entries of the n×nn\times n payoff matrices are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables with parameter p=p(n)p=p(n). We prove that, for nearly all values of the parameter p=p(n)p=p(n), there is an expected polynomial-time algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium in a random win-lose game. More precisely, if pcnap\sim cn^{-a} for some parameters a,c0a,c\ge 0, then there is an expected polynomial-time algorithm whenever a∉{1/2,1}a\not\in \{1/2, 1\}. In addition, if a=1/2a = 1/2 there is an efficient algorithm if either $c \le e^{-52} 2^{-8} $ or c0.977c\ge 0.977. If a=1a=1, then there is an expected polynomial-time algorithm if either c0.3849c\le 0.3849 or clog9nc\ge \log^9 n.

View on arXiv
Comments on this paper