Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has enabled understanding of both speech and non-speech audio, but exposing new safety risks emerging from complex audio inputs that are inadequately handled by current safeguards. We introduce SACRED-Bench (Speech-Audio Composition for RED-teaming) to evaluate the robustness of LLMs under complex audio-based attacks. Unlike existing perturbation-based methods that rely on noise optimization or white-box access, SACRED-Bench exploits speech-audio composition mechanisms. SACRED-Bench adopts three mechanisms: (a) speech overlap and multi-speaker dialogue, which embeds harmful prompts beneath or alongside benign speech; (b) speech-audio mixture, which imply unsafe intent via non-speech audio alongside benign speech or audio; and (c) diverse spoken instruction formats (open-ended QA, yes/no) that evade text-only filters. Experiments show that, even Gemini 2.5 Pro, the state-of-the-art proprietary LLM, still exhibits 66% attack success rate in SACRED-Bench test set, exposing vulnerabilities under cross-modal, speech-audio composition attacks. To bridge this gap, we propose SALMONN-Guard, a safeguard LLM that jointly inspects speech, audio, and text for safety judgments, reducing attack success down to 20%. Our results highlight the need for audio-aware defenses for the safety of multimodal LLMs. The benchmark and SALMONN-Guard checkpoints can be found at this https URL. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.
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