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BadThink: Triggered Overthinking Attacks on Chain-of-Thought Reasoning in Large Language Models

13 November 2025
Shuaitong Liu
Renjue Li
Lijia Yu
Lijun Zhang
Zhiming Liu
Gaojie Jin
    SILMLRM
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTML
Main:7 Pages
10 Figures
Bibliography:2 Pages
7 Tables
Appendix:6 Pages
Abstract

Recent advances in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting have substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but have also introduced their computational efficiency as a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose BadThink, the first backdoor attack designed to deliberately induce "overthinking" behavior in CoT-enabled LLMs while ensuring stealth. When activated by carefully crafted trigger prompts, BadThink manipulates the model to generate inflated reasoning traces - producing unnecessarily redundant thought processes while preserving the consistency of final outputs. This subtle attack vector creates a covert form of performance degradation that significantly increases computational costs and inference time while remaining difficult to detect through conventional output evaluation methods. We implement this attack through a sophisticated poisoning-based fine-tuning strategy, employing a novel LLM-based iterative optimization process to embed the behavior by generating highly naturalistic poisoned data. Our experiments on multiple state-of-the-art models and reasoning tasks show that BadThink consistently increases reasoning trace lengths - achieving an over 17x increase on the MATH-500 dataset - while remaining stealthy and robust. This work reveals a critical, previously unexplored vulnerability where reasoning efficiency can be covertly manipulated, demonstrating a new class of sophisticated attacks against CoT-enabled systems.

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