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Transformer models are foundational to natural language processing (NLP) applications, yet remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks introduced through poisoned data, which implant hidden behaviors during training. To strengthen the ability to prevent such compromises, recent research has focused on designing increasingly stealthy attacks to stress-test existing defenses, pairing backdoor behaviors with stylized artifact or token-level perturbation triggers. However, this trend diverts attention from the harder and more realistic case: making the model respond to semantic triggers such as specific names or entities, where a successful backdoor could manipulate outputs tied to real people or events in deployed systems. Motivated by this growing disconnect, we introduce SteganoBackdoor, bringing stealth techniques back into line with practical threat models. Leveraging innocuous properties from natural-language steganography, SteganoBackdoor applies a gradient-guided data optimization process to transform semantic trigger seeds into steganographic carriers that embed a high backdoor payload, remain fluent, and exhibit no representational resemblance to the trigger. Across diverse experimental settings, SteganoBackdoor achieves over 99% attack success at an order-of-magnitude lower data-poisoning rate than prior approaches while maintaining unparalleled evasion against a comprehensive suite of data-level defenses. By revealing this practical and covert attack, SteganoBackdoor highlights an urgent blind spot in current defenses and demands immediate attention to adversarial data defenses and real-world threat modeling.
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