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Spectral Sentinel: Scalable Byzantine-Robust Decentralized Federated Learning via Sketched Random Matrix Theory on Blockchain

14 December 2025
Animesh Mishra
    AAMLFedML
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTMLGithub
Main:8 Pages
5 Figures
Bibliography:2 Pages
Abstract

Decentralized federated learning (DFL) enables collaborative model training without centralized trust, but it remains vulnerable to Byzantine clients that poison gradients under heterogeneous (Non-IID) data. Existing defenses face a scalability trilemma: distance-based filtering (e.g., Krum) can reject legitimate Non-IID updates, geometric-median methods incur prohibitive O(n2d)O(n^2 d)O(n2d) cost, and many certified defenses are evaluated only on models below 100M parameters. We propose Spectral Sentinel, a Byzantine detection and aggregation framework that leverages a random-matrix-theoretic signature: honest Non-IID gradients produce covariance eigenspectra whose bulk follows the Marchenko-Pastur law, while Byzantine perturbations induce detectable tail anomalies. Our algorithm combines Frequent Directions sketching with data-dependent MP tracking, enabling detection on models up to 1.5B parameters using O(k2)O(k^2)O(k2) memory with k≪dk \ll dk≪d. Under a (σ,f)(\sigma,f)(σ,f) threat model with coordinate-wise honest variance bounded by σ2\sigma^2σ2 and f<1/2f < 1/2f<1/2 adversaries, we prove (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)(ϵ,δ)-Byzantine resilience with convergence rate O(σf/T+f2/T)O(\sigma f / \sqrt{T} + f^2 / T)O(σf/T​+f2/T), and we provide a matching information-theoretic lower bound Ω(σf/T)\Omega(\sigma f / \sqrt{T})Ω(σf/T​), establishing minimax optimality. We implement the full system with blockchain integration on Polygon networks and validate it across 144 attack-aggregator configurations, achieving 78.4 percent average accuracy versus 48-63 percent for baseline methods.

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