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Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost
  Sharing Games

Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2013
14 February 2014
R. Gopalakrishnan
Jason R. Marden
Adam Wierman
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTML

Papers citing "Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games"

3 / 3 papers shown
Adaptive Incentive Design with Multi-Agent Meta-Gradient Reinforcement
  Learning
Adaptive Incentive Design with Multi-Agent Meta-Gradient Reinforcement LearningAdaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2021
Jiachen Yang
Ethan Wang
Rakshit S. Trivedi
T. Zhao
H. Zha
246
26
0
20 Dec 2021
Are Multiagent Systems Resilient to Communication Failures?
Are Multiagent Systems Resilient to Communication Failures?
Philip N. Brown
H. Borowski
Jason R. Marden
AI4CE
49
7
0
23 Oct 2017
Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and
  Stability
Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and Stability
Vinod Ramaswamy
Dario Paccagnan
Jason R. Marden
63
10
0
03 Oct 2017
1
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