Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity
Mechanisms for Social Choice

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Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity Mechanisms for Social Choice

12 November 2018

Kamesh Munagala

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Papers citing "Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity Mechanisms for Social Choice"

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Title
The Panel Complexity of Sortition: Is 12 Angry Men Enough? Johannes Brustle Simone Fioravanti Tomasz Ponitka Jeremy Vollen 96 0 0 29 Apr 2025
Breaking the Metric Voting Distortion Barrier Moses Charikar Prasanna Ramakrishnan Kangning Wang Hongxun Wu 44 26 0 30 Jun 2023
Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya David Kempe 66 43 0 14 Jun 2022
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture Vasilis Gkatzelis Daniel Halpern Nisarg Shah 89 69 0 16 Apr 2020
Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries Georgios Amanatidis Georgios Birmpas Aris Filos-Ratsikas Alexandros A. Voudouris 77 51 0 18 Jul 2019
Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice Ben Abramowitz Elliot Anshelevich Wennan Zhu 67 28 0 25 Jun 2019
Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems given Candidate Positions Elliot Anshelevich Wennan Zhu 67 31 0 08 May 2018