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Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic
  Commitments
v1v2 (latest)

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2020
3 April 2020
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
S. M. Weinberg
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTML

Papers citing "Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments"

13 / 13 papers shown
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee MechanismsInformation Technology Convergence and Services (ITCS), 2025
Aadityan Ganesh
Clayton Thomas
S. M. Weinberg
45
1
0
02 Dec 2025
Conditional Recall
Conditional Recall
Christoph Schlegel
Xinyuan Sun
134
0
0
24 Oct 2025
Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum
Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in EthereumConference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2024
Kaya Alpturer
S. Matthew Weinberg
194
9
0
30 Sep 2024
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Hao Chung
Tim Roughgarden
Elaine Shi
198
26
0
14 Feb 2024
Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices
Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices
Xinyuan Sun
Davide Crapis
Matt Stephenson
B. Monnot
Thomas Thiery
Jonathan Passerat-Palmbach
281
13
0
14 Nov 2023
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Maryam Bahrani
Pranav Garimidi
Tim Roughgarden
468
25
0
04 Jul 2023
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
R. Canetti
A. Fiat
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
128
0
0
11 Feb 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing RulesSymposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), 2022
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
David C. Parkes
283
51
0
30 Sep 2022
What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design
What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism DesignIACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (IACR ePrint), 2022
Elaine Shi
Hao Chung
Ke Wu
479
35
0
28 Sep 2022
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item
  Auctions for all Distributions
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all DistributionsInformation Technology Convergence and Services (ITCS), 2022
Meryem Essaidi
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
S. M. Weinberg
276
16
0
29 May 2022
Low-latency, Scalable, DeFi with Zef
Low-latency, Scalable, DeFi with Zef
M. Baudet
A. Sonnino
M. Król
141
0
0
13 Jan 2022
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee
  Market
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee MarketConference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2021
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
Daniel J. Moroz
David C. Parkes
Mitchell Stern
321
110
0
25 Mar 2021
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An
  Economic Analysis of EIP-1559
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559
Tim Roughgarden
257
142
0
01 Dec 2020
1
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