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Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of
  Clones and Immune to Spoilers
v1v2v3v4v5v6v7v8v9v10 (latest)

Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers

Public Choice (PC), 2020
5 April 2020
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTML

Papers citing "Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers"

9 / 9 papers shown
Axiomatizations of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four and Final Five elections
Axiomatizations of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four and Final Five elections
Wesley H. Holliday
110
0
0
23 Aug 2025
Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information
Learning to Manipulate under Limited InformationAAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024
Wesley H. Holliday
Alexander Kristoffersen
Eric Pacuit
507
6
0
29 Jan 2024
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in votingEconomics Letters (Econ. Lett.), 2024
Wesley H. Holliday
306
9
0
11 Jan 2024
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split CycleSocial Choice and Welfare (SCW), 2022
Yifeng Ding
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
230
9
0
22 Oct 2022
Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections
Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections
Daria Boratyn
Wojciech Słomczyński
Dariusz Stolicki
Stanisław Szufa
83
3
0
10 Feb 2022
Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
Wesley H. Holliday
Mikayla Kelley
211
3
0
02 Aug 2021
Stable Voting
Stable Voting
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
571
11
0
01 Aug 2021
An Analysis of Random Elections with Large Numbers of Voters
An Analysis of Random Elections with Large Numbers of VotersMathematical Social Sciences (MSS), 2020
M. Harrison-Trainor
100
6
0
07 Sep 2020
Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections
Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
282
17
0
15 Aug 2020
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