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2004.02350
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Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers
5 April 2020
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
Re-assign community
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Papers citing
"Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers"
6 / 6 papers shown
Title
Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information
Wesley H. Holliday
Alexander Kristoffersen
Eric Pacuit
202
4
0
29 Jan 2024
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
Wesley H. Holliday
47
8
0
11 Jan 2024
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
Yifeng Ding
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
39
8
0
22 Oct 2022
Stable Voting
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
82
11
0
01 Aug 2021
An Analysis of Random Elections with Large Numbers of Voters
M. Harrison-Trainor
26
6
0
07 Sep 2020
Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections
Wesley H. Holliday
Eric Pacuit
45
15
0
15 Aug 2020
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