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Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equilibria in
  Multi-Player General-Sum Games

Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player General-Sum Games

11 November 2021
Ioannis Anagnostides
C. Daskalakis
Gabriele Farina
Maxwell Fishelson
Noah Golowich
T. Sandholm
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Papers citing "Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player General-Sum Games"

2 / 2 papers shown
Title
Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stackelberg Games
Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stackelberg Games
Yaolong Yu
Haipeng Chen
22
0
0
06 May 2024
Blackwell Approachability and Low-Regret Learning are Equivalent
Blackwell Approachability and Low-Regret Learning are Equivalent
Jacob D. Abernethy
Peter L. Bartlett
Elad Hazan
65
108
0
08 Nov 2010
1