No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions

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No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions

22 February 2022

Michael I. Jordan

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Papers citing "No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions"

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Title
Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition Zichen Wang Chuanhao Li Huazheng Wang 57 0 0 23 May 2025
Learn then Decide: A Learning Approach for Designing Data Marketplaces Yingqi Gao Jin J. Zhou Hua Zhou Yuxiao Chen Xiaowu Dai 48 0 0 13 Mar 2025
Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners David Easley Yoav Kolumbus Éva Tardos 142 0 0 12 Feb 2025
Time-Varyingness in Auction Breaks Revenue Equivalence Yuma Fujimoto Kaito Ariu Kenshi Abe 29 0 0 16 Oct 2024
No Bidding, No Regret: Pairwise-Feedback Mechanisms for Digital Goods and Data Auctions Zachary Robertson Oluwasanmi Koyejo 51 0 0 02 Jun 2023
Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules Meet Principal-Agent Model Siyu Chen Jibang Wu Yifan Wu Zhuoran Yang 80 7 0 15 Mar 2023
A Reinforcement Learning Approach in Multi-Phase Second-Price Auction Design Rui Ai Boxiang Lyu Zhaoran Wang Zhuoran Yang Michael I. Jordan 72 3 0 19 Oct 2022