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Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item
  Auctions for all Distributions

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions

29 May 2022
Meryem Essaidi
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
S. M. Weinberg
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTML

Papers citing "Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions"

4 / 4 papers shown
Title
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Maryam Bahrani
Pranav Garimidi
Tim Roughgarden
118
19
0
04 Jul 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
David C. Parkes
76
46
0
30 Sep 2022
What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design
What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design
Elaine Shi
Hao Chung
Ke Wu
82
27
0
28 Sep 2022
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee
  Market
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
Daniel J. Moroz
David C. Parkes
Mitchell Stern
55
82
0
25 Mar 2021
1