Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis

18 May 2023

Papers citing "Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis"

4 / 4 papers shown

Title
An Interpretable Automated Mechanism Design Framework with Large Language Models Jiayuan Liu Mingyu Guo Vincent Conitzer 72 0 0 16 Feb 2025
GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning Tonghan Wang Yanchen Jiang David C. Parkes 40 7 0 11 Jun 2024
Benefits of Permutation-Equivariance in Auction Mechanisms Tian Qin Fengxiang He Dingfeng Shi Wenbing Huang Dacheng Tao 31 11 0 11 Oct 2022
Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions Michael J. Curry T. Sandholm John P. Dickerson 33 28 0 06 Feb 2022