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No Bidding, No Regret: Pairwise-Feedback Mechanisms for Digital Goods
  and Data Auctions

No Bidding, No Regret: Pairwise-Feedback Mechanisms for Digital Goods and Data Auctions

2 June 2023
Zachary Robertson
Oluwasanmi Koyejo
ArXivPDFHTML

Papers citing "No Bidding, No Regret: Pairwise-Feedback Mechanisms for Digital Goods and Data Auctions"

1 / 1 papers shown
Title
Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules
  Meet Principal-Agent Model
Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules Meet Principal-Agent Model
Siyu Chen
Jibang Wu
Yifan Wu
Zhuoran Yang
26
6
0
15 Mar 2023
1