Title |
|---|
 Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With CapacitiesAdaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2024 |
 Fair Division with Market ValuesAAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024 |
 Centralized Selection with Preferences in the Presence of BiasesInternational Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2024 |
 Fair Division with Allocator's PreferenceWorkshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2023 |
 Fairness in Matching under UncertaintyInternational Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2023 |
 Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and EfficientlyAdaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2022 |
 Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated PreferencesAdaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2022 |
