Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms

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Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms

Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2022

15 February 2022

David C. Parkes

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Papers citing "Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms"

9 / 9 papers shown

Title
LLM Economist: Large Population Models and Mechanism Design in Multi-Agent Generative Simulacra Seth Karten Wenzhe Li Zihan Ding Samuel Kleiner Yu Bai Chi Jin LLMAG 190 6 0 21 Jul 2025
Impact of Price Inflation on Algorithmic Collusion Through Reinforcement Learning Agents Sebastián Tinoco Andrés Abeliuk Javier Ruiz del Solar 204 1 0 05 Apr 2025
Learning Collusion in Episodic, Inventory-Constrained MarketsAdaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2024 Paul Friedrich Barna Pásztor Giorgia Ramponi 227 2 0 24 Oct 2024
Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Price Collusion in Two-sided Markets Cristian Chica Yinglong Guo Gilad Lerman 129 2 0 04 Jul 2024
Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via SteganographyNeural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2024 S. Motwani Mikhail Baranchuk Martin Strohmeier Vijay Bolina Juil Sock Lewis Hammond Christian Schroeder de Witt 810 4 0 12 Feb 2024
Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement LearningInternational Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2022 M. Gerstgrasser David C. Parkes OffRL 429 25 0 19 Oct 2022
Stackelberg POMDP: A Reinforcement Learning Approach for Economic Design Gianluca Brero Alon Eden D. Chakrabarti M. Gerstgrasser Amy Greenwald Vincent Li David C. Parkes 314 4 0 07 Oct 2022
Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A SurveyArtificial Intelligence (AIJ), 2022 Matthew Olckers T. Walsh 221 12 0 05 Oct 2022
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable EconomicsJournal of the ACM (JACM), 2017 Paul Dutting Zhe Feng Harikrishna Narasimhan David C. Parkes S. Ravindranath 469 52 0 12 Jun 2017