Communities
Connect sessions
AI calendar
Organizations
Join Slack
Contact Sales
Search
Open menu
Home
Papers
2407.13634
Cited By
v1
v2
v3 (latest)
Truthful and Almost Envy-Free Mechanism of Allocating Indivisible Goods: the Power of Randomness
IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2024
18 July 2024
Xiaolin Bu
Biaoshuai Tao
Re-assign community
ArXiv (abs)
PDF
HTML
Github
Papers citing
"Truthful and Almost Envy-Free Mechanism of Allocating Indivisible Goods: the Power of Randomness"
5 / 5 papers shown
Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake
Haris Aziz
Xinhang Lu
Simon Mackenzie
Mashbat Suzuki
161
0
0
07 Nov 2025
Incentive Analysis of Collusion in Fair Division
Haoqiang Huang
Biaoshuai Tao
Mingwei Yang
Shengwei Zhou
104
1
0
02 Oct 2025
On Pareto-Optimal and Fair Allocations with Personalized Bi-Valued Utilities
Jiarong Jin
Biaoshuai Tao
237
2
0
24 Jul 2025
When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?
Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT), 2025
Bo Li
Biaoshuai Tao
Fangxiao Wang
Xiaowei Wu
Mingwei Yang
Shengwei Zhou
378
1
0
02 May 2025
Fair and Truthful Allocations Under Leveled Valuations
Information Processing Letters (IPL), 2024
George Christodoulou
Vasilis Christoforidis
206
5
0
17 Feb 2025
1
Page 1 of 1
